Rasmussens Dynamic Safety Barriers







Andrew Hatch

Broaden your perspective on internal and external forces that create risk

Get greater value from post-mortems and ask better questions

Understand where the margins for error exist and how to reinforce them

References and further reading

Jens Rasmussen
(1926 - 2018)
Human factors and Safety Science

Socio-Technical Systems

- Hierarchical

- Multi-disciplinary

Systems Thinking

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thinking_In_Systems:_A_Primer

Socio Technical Systems

...in organizational development (Socio Technical Systems) is an approach to complex organizational work design that recognizes the interaction between people and technology in workplaces.

Rasmussen Structural Hierarchy

Perfect Socio Technical System!

The strongest barrier, also the easiest to see

Authoritative power

Ruthless

Burnout, toxicity

Silos and politics

Attrition increases, talent dilutes

Regulatory and Compliance, mostly

Performance Barrier

Economic Barrier

The weakest barrier, pushback may require extreme measures

Operations are the last line of defence

Boundary visibility and awareness becomes difficult as complexity grows

Defence-in-depth strategies to maintain the error margin are crucial

Threats are mostly internal, economic and workload forces create constant pressure

Acts as a "virtual boundary" i.e. if we cross it, bad things start happening

Never static. Can drift undetected a.k.a "Normalization of Deviance"

Major deviations can be powerful forces against other boundaries i.e. we can harness how upset VPs get!

Normalization of Deviance

"...the process in which deviance from correct or proper behavior or rule becomes culturally normalized"

When the Error Margin starts drifting to the boundary

And it's hidden by rationalization/cover-up of systemic failures

Open vs Closed Loop

Error Margin Tests

Organic

Synthetic Fault Injection

Deviance to Normal, steady-state behavior

Don't play root cause whack-a-mole on the Performance Boundary. Look broader, consider all contributing factors. Understand.

Do you know how much buffer your Error Margins have? Are your systems brittle/robust?

What deviances are you normalizing? How close to the edge of the envelope are you operating?

Are your new intiatives increasing Error Margin resilience or awareness? If not, should you really be doing them?

References and Further reading

Risk Management in a Dynamic Society - J.Rasmussen

Thinking in Systems - D.Meadows

The Challenger Lauch Decision - D.Vaughn

Critiques on Root Cause D.Woods, R.Cook, E.Hollnagel, S.Dekker et al

Normal Accidents - C.Perrow

Learning More from Complex Systems - A.Hatch